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ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
This is a relatively simple case where the officer made a mistake
and the district court determined that the mistake was not reasonable
under the specific circumstances. The case should have ended there
because the constitutional protections against unreasonable search and
seizure are worth protection regardless of the eventual outcome of the
police investigation.
This case is important to the extent the State encourages a new rule
which would lead to further erosion of our fundamental liberties. The Fifth
Circuit warned, “... if officers are allowed to stop vehicles based upon their
subjective belief that traffic laws have been violated even where no such
violation has, in fact, occurred, the potential for abuse of traffic infractions
as pretext for effecting stops seems boundless and the costs to privacy
rights excessive.” U.S. v. Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d 282, 289 (5th Cir. 1999).
The State does not dispute that the officer’s mistake in this case was
unreasonable, as determined by the district court. “[L]aw enforcement
officers [have] broad leeway to conduct searches and seizures regardless of
whether their subjective intent corresponds to the legal justification for
their actions. But the flip side of that leeway is that the legal justification
4

must be objectively grounded. U.S. v. Miller, 146 F.3d 274, 279 (5th Cir.
1998)(footnote omitted). The Fifth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have held
that a mistake of law cannot provide reasonable suspicion or probable
cause to justify a traffic stop. U.S. v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1279
(11th Cir. 2003).
Courts applying the majority rule have concluded that the legal
justification for a stop based on conduct accurately observed but
mistakenly understood by officers to be illegal is not “objectively
grounded.” Miller at 279; State v. Louwrens, 792 N.W.2d 649, 653 (Iowa
2010).
DETENTION FOR “FUTURE” TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS
The State here however engages in a strained “law school exam
question” analysis in order to somehow ignore the officer’s mistake and
reevaluate it under a different standard. Such efforts are misplaced. If the
officer had used better judgment and been a little less eager, then perhaps
the vehicle would have committed a traffic infraction a few seconds later
by turning onto a public street. Instead, the State urges this Court to
speculate where the vehicle was going, including suggesting that instead
of driving, young adults in Rexburg would more likely have walked 300
yards to a convenience store on a dark, frigid winter night.
APPELLANT REPLY BRIEF
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Thus, this Court is forced to either sustain the rule relating to
mistaken beliefs of an officer, or articulate a new rule allowing law
enforcement officers in Idaho to wander into the misty abyss of predicting
future traffic violations to justify Terry-based traffic detentions. The nature
of such a rule would allow officers to enter private property to investigate
unregistered vehicles or one with defective equipment because there may
be indication of an intent of a driver at some point in the future to venture
onto a public roadway. Such a rule could be applied to any type of driving
behavior which may indicate a potential to drive fast, fail to yield or make
an improper lane change, even though no such violation has yet occurred.
The Supreme Court in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659, 99 S.Ct.
1391, 1399, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) noted that “[t]he foremost method of
enforcing traffic and vehicle safety regulations ... is acting upon observed
violations,” which afford the “ ‘quantum of individualized suspicion’ “
necessary to ensure that police discretion is sufficiently constrained, id., at
654–655, 99 S.Ct., at 1396 (quoting United States v. Martinez–Fuerte, 428
U.S., at 560, 96 S.Ct., at 3084).
The rule urged by the State in this case would greatly diminish any
restraint on police discretion and allow far too much speculation into the
decision making of law enforcement officers.
APPELLANT REPLY BRIEF
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The State cites to State v. Chapman, 146 Idaho 346, 349, 194 P.3d
550, 553 (Ct. App. 2008) for the quote, “[O]fficers may conduct
investigative detentions, including traffic stops, based upon reasonable
suspicion that an individual has been or is about to be engaged in criminal
activity, including suspicion that a vehicle is being operated contrary to
traffic laws.” (emphasis added). This merely cites to the long standing rule
cited in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1400,
1401, 59 L.Ed.2d 660, 672, 673 (1979); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S.
411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 694–95, 66 L.Ed.2d 621, 628 (1981);
That rule however describes only an example of “suspicion that a
vehicle is being operated contrary to traffic laws.” The Chapman court
likewise cites to State v. Irwin, 143 Idaho 102, 104, 137 P.3d 1024, 1026
(Ct.App.2006)(“ Thus, an officer may stop a vehicle and question its
occupants if the officer has reasonable suspicion of criminal activity,
including suspicion that the vehicle is being operated contrary to traffic
laws.”); and State v. Patterson, 140 Idaho 612, 614, 97 P.3d 479, 481
(Ct.App.2004)(“ Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may stop a
vehicle to investigate possible criminal behavior if there is a reasonable
and articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic
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laws.”)(emphasis added). None of these cases suggest a rule where a vehicle
may be detained because it is about to be operated contrary to traffic laws.
Although the State cites to a California case where a vehicle was
being operated off road without any lights at all, the vast majority of courts
have ruled in favor of the “is being driven” rule suggested in Idaho by Irwin
and Patterson, supra. See State v. DeBoer, No. 34512, 2008 WL 9468777, at
*1 (Idaho Ct. App. Sept. 19, 2008-Unpublished)(Under the Fourth
Amendment, an officer may stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal
behavior if there is a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle
is being driven contrary to traffic laws.). U.S. v. Botero–Ospina, 71 F.3d
783, 787 (10th Cir.1995) (“A traffic stop is valid under the Fourth
Amendment if the stop is based on an observed traffic violation or if the
police officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or
equipment violation has occurred or is occurring.”); U.S. v. Jones, 501 F.
Supp. 2d 1284, 1288 (D. Kan. 2007)(“An initial traffic stop is valid under
the Fourth Amendment not only if based on an observed traffic violation,
but also if the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or
equipment violation has occurred or is occurring.”); U.S. v. Vercher, 358
F.3d 1257, 1261 (10th Cir. 2004)(Whether a traffic stop is valid under the
Fourth Amendment turns on whether “this particular officer had
APPELLANT REPLY BRIEF
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reasonable suspicion that this particular motorist violated any one of the
multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations of the
jurisdiction.”); U.S. v. Callarman, 273 F.3d 1284, 1286 (10th Cir.2001)(“A
traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment if it is “based on an
observed traffic violation or if the police officer has reasonable articulable
suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is
occurring.”); U.S. v. Gonzales, 535 F.3d 1174, 1183 (10th Cir. 2008)(“The
federal test for determining the validity of a traffic stop simply requires us
to determine whether a traffic violation has occurred.”); U.S. v. Nicholson,
721 F.3d 1236, 1238 (10th Cir. 2013)(“The Fourth Amendment requires
that a traffic stop be “objectively justified” at its inception. That means a
traffic stop must be “based on an observed traffic violation” or a police
officer’s “reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment
violation has occurred or is occurring.”); U.S. v. Wallace, 213 F.3d 1216,
1219 (9th Cir. 2000), as amended (July 7, 2000)(“[T]he decision to stop an
automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe
that a traffic violation has occurred.”)(citing Whren v. United States, 517
U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996); State v. Dewbre, 133 Idaho
663, 665, 991 P.2d 388, 390 (Ct. App. 1999)(Under the Fourth Amendment,
an officer may stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal behavior if
APPELLANT REPLY BRIEF
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there is an articulable and reasonable suspicion that the vehicle is being
driven contrary to traffic laws.); State v. Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930, 932, 829
P.2d 520, 522 (1992); State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 208, 953 P.2d 645,
648 (Ct.App.1998). (emphasis added).
The distinction is best demonstrated in the Idaho case, State v.
Naccarato, 126 Idaho 10, 12, 878 P.2d 184, 186, which found that a noninvestigatory traffic stop involves only violations that are occurring in the
present or have occurred in the past tense. “A traffic stop, which
constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, must be supported by
reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven
contrary to traffic laws -or that either the vehicle or the occupant is subject
to detention in connection with a violation of other laws.” Id. (emphasis
added). If the Naccarato court intended there to be no distinction between
detention for traffic laws and criminal laws, then why list these two
different scenarios disjunctively? Much like the words of a statute, the
words of precedential decisions of the Supreme Court should not be
interpreted in a way that words become “void, superfluous, or redundant.”
By analogy, See State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 866, 264 P.3d 970, 973
(2011)(describing how courts “must give effect to all the words and
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provisions of the statute so that none will be void, superfluous, or
redundant”).
That the “future violation” scenario was presented as a judicial
creation in this case, instead of the justification provided by the officer (or
even the State in its original arguments) shows just how widely the rule
concerning traffic stops for observed violations is understood as “has
occurred or is occurring.” During the hearing and proceedings related to
the suppression motion, neither the officer nor the State argued that the
stop was justified by the potential for a future traffic violation. Adopting a
new rule allowing such stops opens the door unnecessarily to speculative
reasons for traffic stops. And a bright line should be applied rather than
hiding such a ruling in an unpublished ruling. The Appellant is either on
one side of the constitutional restraint or the other. To rule against him
without announcing a new rule which would apply to all cases would deny
the Appellant equal protection of the law. Thus, the Court must decide
whether the broad reasoning from Ohio or the law applied in California to
a fairly specific scenario (driving with no lights at all) should be applied in
Idaho. The current understanding by law enforcement (that they must be
observing a completed or in progress violation) provides the greatest
protection against pretextual abuse of traffic stops. Creating a new rule to
APPELLANT REPLY BRIEF
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preserve the outcome of this case is not worth the slippery slope created by
the new rule propounded by the State.
COMMUNITY CARETAKING
Because the State did not cross-appeal, the community caretaker
ground for the stop must be based solely on the facts as put forward by the
district court. The State is basically putting forth an argument that has
often been referred to as the “right-result, wrong-theory rule.” Though it
has been stated in varying terms, the rule is generally phrased as: “Where
an order of a lower court is correct, but based upon an erroneous theory,
the order will be affirmed upon the correct theory.” Andre v. Morrow, 106
Idaho 455, 459, 680 P.2d 1355, 1359 (1984).
However, the appellate court may only uphold the errant decision
“by applying a correct theory to the same facts (or to undisputed facts in
the record).” State v. Hoskins, 165 Idaho 217, 443 P.3d 231, 236 (2019).
The record of facts relied upon by the district court are described in
its decision of December 7, 2017, pp. 4 – 5:
1. Bestor testified that he pulled the Subaru over because one of the
headlights was not working, and he believed that this was a violation
of the statute governing headlight use.
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2. He also gave testimony that he was in the parking lot because he
believed that Frandsen was in the area and he had received
information that Frandsen was dealing drugs.
3. Bestor did not believe that the occupants of the Subaru needed police
assistance, nor did he “perceive a medical emergency or other
exigency compelling [his] immediate action.”
4. [H]e pulled the Subaru over because he believed that a statute was
being violated and possibly because he was already searching for
Frandsen.
In order to justify the detention of a citizen, the officer must have a
genuine and warranted concern rather than simply the officer’s curiosity,
an unsubstantiated suspicion of criminal activity, or an unwarranted
concern that help might be needed. State v. Cutler, 143 Idaho 297, 302, 141
P.3d 1166, 1171 (Ct. App. 2006).
The State’s reliance on Deputy Bestor’s subjective conclusion that it
creates “a hazard to the public to operate a vehicle on a public roadway
without a headlight,” does not create an exigency where none exists. The
State’s reliance on the California case People v. Ellis, 14 Cal.App.4th 1198,
1201-1202 (1993), to suggest that the Deputy was viewing a vehicle being
driven with a broken headlight as some kind of a “common sense”
APPELLANT REPLY BRIEF
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“exigency compelling [his] immediate action,” is misplaced. In that case,
the vehicle was being driven without any lights at all. People v. Ellis, 14
Cal.App.4th 1198, 1201-1202 (1993).
The State’s reliance upon the Indiana case, Pruitt v State, 934 N.E.2d
767, 770 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), is likewise misplaced. That Court relied on
the Indiana common law interpretation of a state law allowing for
enforcement of Indiana traffic laws on private property. See Id. at 769 (“In
this case, the statute at issue, Indiana Code section 9–30–10–17, like
Indiana Code section 9–30–10–16 in Guidry, is not explicitly limited in
application to persons who operate a motor vehicle on public roads.”).
Community caretaking cannot be invoked to justify the detention of
a citizen that is prompted merely by an officer’s curiosity, a subjective but
unsubstantiated suspicion of criminal activity, or even an unwarranted
concern that help might be needed. State v. Maddox, 137 Idaho 824, 82526, 54 P.3d 464, 468-69 (Ct. App. 2002). The Defendant has found no
authority in Idaho justifying a caretaker detention based on a defective
equipment violation. The State would have the Court extend the narrow
caretaker exception to include the activity of this deputy, even though the
State concedes the reason for his traffic stop was flawed. No such extension
is warranted.
APPELLANT REPLY BRIEF
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As the Maddox court warned, “Allowing officers to conduct
community caretaking stops whenever they anticipate that a citizen might
be about to embark upon an unwise venture would present far too great an
opportunity for pretextual stops and far too great an imposition on the
privacy interests of our citizenry to comport with the Fourth Amendment.”
Maddox, 137 Idaho at 825, 54 P.3d at 468. The caretaker exception must be
maintained as a narrow one, and applying the rule in this case would open
the door to caretaker detentions based on simple defective equipment
issues.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the Appellant requests that the
Judgment of Conviction be vacated and the case remanded back to the
District Court for further proceedings consistent with the guidance of the
Court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THE 4TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 2019.

_______________________________________
RANDOLPH B. NEAL, ISB #6565
ATTORNEY FOR THE APPELLANT
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DATED THE 4TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 2019.
___________________________________
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